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ABSTRACT 
What can strategic management research do to help to make sense of the Covid-19 
disruption, and what are the implications of the disruption for the strategy field? I argue 
that among the streams in strategy research, behavioral strategy is uniquely situated in 
terms of providing a psychologically-based interpretive lens that could lend great 
insight into decision-making in extreme conditions. However, the disruption also points 
to weakness in current behavioral strategy thinking, notably with respect to the role of 
models vis-á-vis judgment in strategic decision-making, the deeply social (political, 
institutional) nature of strategy making, and the treatment of fundamental uncertainty.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategy research features numerous frameworks and theories, some of which are (intended to 
be) general (e.g., the resource-based view, the positioning view) and some of which deal with more 
partial aspects of strategy (e.g., alliances, strategic human capital). However, among these many 
frameworks, none are dedicated to the understanding the strategic implications of disruptions, that 
is, radical and at least partially unforeseen changes that are exogenous to a set of interacting firms, 
such as industries or ecosystems. Schumpeterian theories of competition deal with change coming 
from within this set (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The dynamic capabilities view may offer insight into 
adaptation, but does so at a high level of abstraction (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The real 
options view (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001) rests on a probabilistic framework that doesn’t easily 
accommodate the kind of event that Covid-19 was: While Covid-19 may not have been entirely 
unanticipated in the epidemiological community (Maxmen, 2020), no one in the business 
community appears to have anticipated it (i.e., placed a probability on it happening).   
In this Editorial Commentary I argue that the emerging behavioral strategy view offers unique 
insight into decision-making in a situation of disruption, understood here as a situation in which a 
low probability or even entirely unanticipated event emerges that has drastic impact and 
consequences at a systemic level, upsetting not just relations between firms and their stakeholders 
within a single industry, but hitting at the level of the entire economy. It is hard to dispute that the 
Covid-19 disruption was a systemic disturbance, potentially exacerbated by both behavioral 
responses to the virus itself (Andersen, Hansen, Johannesen, & Sheridan, 2020) and by government 
interventions aimed at locking down much of the economy (Baker, Bloom, Davis, Kost, Sammon, 
& Viratyosin, 2020). 
BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY 
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Behavioral strategy refers to the application of insights from psychology and behavioral 
economics to the research and practice of strategic management. In one definition of the field, 
“[b]ehavioral strategy merges cognitive and social psychology with strategic management theory 
and practice. Behavioral strategy aims to bring realistic assumptions about human cognition, 
emotions, and social behavior to the strategic management of organizations and, thereby, to enrich 
strategy theory, empirical research, and real-world practice” (Powell, Lovallo & Fox, 2011: 1371).  
While the notion of “behavioral strategy” is of rather recent origin (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010), 
the use of psychology in strategy research started decades ago. Thus, the behavioral theory of the 
firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012) is often seen as an important source theory for 
strategy. Work on dominant logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), competitive interaction attention 
(Ocasio, 1997) and the role of various cognitive constructs held at the firm or top manager level for 
competitive rivalry (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Lant and Baum, 1995) and strategic interaction 
(Chen, Smith & Grimm, 1992) are framed as contributions to strategic management. Although 
psychology-based, or at least psychology-inspired, work on the role of aspirations (Greve, 1998), 
goals (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011), sensemaking (Weick, 1995), routines (Cyert & March, 1963), 
decision theory (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993),  hubris (Bollaert and Petit, 2010), top management 
teams (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and learning (Levinthal and March, 1993) may be framed as 
contributions to organization theory, change, and innovation, such work has distinct strategic 
implications (cf. Powell et al., 2011). However, these streams are also quite heterogeneous, raising 
the issue of what is the core of behavioral strategy (see also Hambrick & Crossland, 2019).  
 In short, behavioral strategy addresses the established core issues in strategic management 
(e.g., CEO and top management team behaviors, entry decisions, competitive interaction, firm 
heterogeneity) in a particular way, specifically,  
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1) it is microfoundational (Felin, Foss, & Ployhardt, 2015), building insight into higher-level 
strategic phenomena from psychology-based insights on the behaviors of individuals; 
2) all fields of psychology, as well as relevant parts of behavioral economics and sociology, are 
potentially relevant; 
3) assumptions about behaviors and interactions are to be based in evidence rather than the 
extent to which they are “elegant” or similar.  
Behavioral strategy may then be pragmatically defined as a commitment to understanding the 
(social, cognitive, motivational) psychology of strategists and other organizational members to the 
extent that these matter to the key phenomena of interest to strategy research (ultimately, sustained 
competitive advantage).  
APPLYING BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY INSIGHTS TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
In the following I exemplify how a number of typical behavioral strategy themes illuminate 
decision making during the Covid-19 disruption.  
Sense-making and Covid-19 strategies  
The notion of sense-making emerged as an attempt to argue that decisions take place against a 
backdrop of shared emergent meaning and that it also serves as retrospective developments of  
plausible images or narratives that rationalize and justify collective decision-making  (Weick, 
1995). While Weick seems to think of sense-making as a general phenomenon, it is arguable that it 
becomes of particular importance during a disruption. The reasons lie in the deeply uncertain and 
ambiguous nature of the initial phases of the Covid-19 disruption as well as in the ex post 
rationalizations of the decisions made in these initial phases. Decision-making in these phases was 
characterized by “novelty, complexity and open-endedness” (Mintzberg et al., 1976: 250), and lack 
of clarity on what should be ordered responses to the situation. 
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Decision-makers did not have a precise understanding of the dynamics of the spread of the 
disease, the epidemiological parameters, the possible role of superspreaders and how contact 
patterns mattered, the spatial variation in incidence, and so on.  Moreover, how Covid-19 may 
influence the economy was fundamentally ambiguous (Ehrig & Foss, 2020), as was the full set of 
possible policy actions and the outcomes of such actions under different scenarios.  
Indeed, one can question whether Gaussian risk-management applies at all in a disruption 
such as Covid-19 (Taleb, 2007), and whether it makes sense to posit the existence of optimal 
response strategies (e.g., maximizing the life-years saved, minimizing the drop of GNP, taking the 
number of deaths as a constraint). These may sound like profoundly “philosophical” issues, but 
ultimately they matter for assessing failures and success post the pandemic. For example, have we 
in fact witnessed massive expert failure during the pandemic (e.g., some wildly unrealistic 
projections of the number of deaths from the virus; a misguided emphasis on herd immunity)? Have 
we witnessed massive regulatory failure (notably the failure to keep the virus out of the homes of 
the old and vulnerable)? Or, is it pointless to blame anyone given the epistemic conditions existing 
at the onset of the pandemic?  
Research suggests that decision-making under these conditions follows a groping, iterative 
approach as decision-makers seem to literally make sense out of the situation, which certainly 
describes decision-making throughout spring of 2020. The clear exception to this is those decision-
makers who were in fact able to engage in rapid, correct sensemaking, based on prior experience.  
For example, Taiwan was able to move quickly and successfully because Taiwanese decision-
makers read the early signals correctly based on their earlier experience with the SARS virus. 
Focused attention and situationally dependent preferences 
For those decision-makers without such experience, the initial decision-making, which mainly 
consisted of implementing lock-downs, took place under a sudden and drastic change of how events 
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were interpreted. While initially health authorities (e.g., in Europe) had refrained from doing much 
more than issuing warnings against flying to certain destinations in China or taking arriving 
passengers’ temperatures in airports, political decision makers became alarmed in the first weeks of 
March by a sudden and surprising spike of hospitalization cases in countries outside of the original 
Chinese epicenter, which seemed to align with drastic projections of the number of fatalities from 
the virus (e.g., Walker et al., 2020).  
Their attention entirely refocused (Ocasio, 1997), politicians acted swiftly on a minimax (or 
“precautionary”) principle and implemented emergency legislation or made administrative 
decisions that in most cases (across the world’s nations) led to unprecedented lockdowns. Some 
suggest that the costs of these lockdowns have so far been so high that they exceed the savings in 
terms of life years valued using standard health economics methods and exceed the resources that 
political decision-makers are usually willing to expend on saving life years from non-Covid 19 
diseases. This may be taken as evidence that decision-makers’ preferences are situation-dependent 
as situations shape attention (March & Shapira, 1992).   
Interestingly, these reactions to threats were in some cases not endorsed by epidemiologists. 
Indeed, in parts of the epidemiological community, obtaining herd immunity (absent vaccination) 
was seen as natural, unavoidable and not to be resisted. However, politicians face very different 
incentives than publicly employed health bureaucrats or professors, and could focus largely on the 
notion that potentially massive deaths because of Covid 19 is politically unacceptable. As a result, 
the initial coalitions between politicians and top epidemiological and other health experts were 
strained (e.g., Denmark) and in some cases even broken up (UK). In the sole country that has more 
or less explicitly followed an official policy of herd immunity, namely Sweden, the coalition 
between politicians and experts seems to have become stronger, perhaps reflecting escalating 
commitment in the face of external critique.  
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Biases, group think and the absence of diverse perspectives 
Throughout the Covid-19 crisis, examples can be found of the biased decision-making 
resulting from more or less automatic application of heuristics that the biases and heuristics 
literature details (for an introduction, see Kahneman, 2011). In fact, these were an important part of 
the process of sensemaking throughout the crisis. The heuristic that steered most countries’ Covid-
19 strategies was to put a heavy weight in decision making on the scenarios that emerge from 
pandemic modeling (Ehrig & Foss, 2020). This was accompanied by group think potentially 
aggravated by a mélange of worst-case forecasts, media sensationalism, and general public fear.  In 
turn, this was reinforced by potentially misleading reference points, such as dramatic footage from 
pandemic epicenters like Wuhan and Lombardy, confirmation biases supporting the choice of such 
reference points and leading to escalation of commitment to the chosen courses of action.  The point 
here isn’t whether the strategies that were adopted were the right ones or not, but rather that 
conditions were created under which certain strategies were quickly identified as “right” and other 
perspectives that would allow for the identification of other alternatives did not enter high-level 
decision-making and public discourse until long into the Covid-19 crisis. As a perhaps telling 
example, only Norway appears to have created an expert group with a representation of expertise 
other than medical and epidemiological expertise.  
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE COVID DISRUPTION  
FOR BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY 
Challenge #1: The role of models and forecasts for decision-making 
As an approach to strategic decision-making, behavioral strategy suggests that strategists are 
not likely to be good at using formal models, rules, forecasts and so on. The usual reason given is 
that most decision-makers are not natural statisticians (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). There is evidence of 
such behavior during the disruption. For example, some decision-makers took even the most 
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extreme model projections at face value as not only highly unlikely worst case scenarios but as 
actual deterministic predictions. Decision makers seemed not to complain about, or understand the 
consequences of, the lack of error bands around the initial forecasts. However, there is another 
dimension that is relevant, namely that decision-makers may “over-rely” on those models, data and 
forecast that are actually available. This is particularly problematic exactly when the problems faced 
by decision-makers are ill-structured (Mintzberg et al., 1976) and it may be important to also bring 
intuition and “soft data” to bear on the issues (Foss & Klein, 2012), or when it is important to act 
very quickly. As an example of how this can be made researchable,  Choudhury, Starr, and Agarwal 
(2020) experimentally examine biased decision-making under uncertainty and in the context of (and 
partly brought about by) machine learning, and show how specific domain expertise of users can 
help to mitigate biases.  
Challenge #2: The inherently social nature of strategy-making 
 Our basic strategy frameworks typically slice out and highlight a small portion of social 
reality, which is justified by asserting that this particular slice (e.g., as represented by the Porterian 
five forces) has a particularly strong impact on firm performance. However, the disruption reminds 
us that sometimes the slice expands or even becomes irrelevant as other forces become dominant. In 
general, strategy-making does not take place in a vacuum, but is a deeply social process. While this 
may sound banal, it is arguable that strategy research does not take it sufficiently into account. For 
example, the Covid-19 disruption exemplifies not only, for example, socially transmitted reference 
points for decision-making, but also the impact of different experts and expert groups, disciplines 
and particular modelling approaches. These have varying social standing and prestige, so that their 
influencing on what information will be collected and attended to differ.   
 In terms of future research, this can potentially be examined by looking at the advice 
networks of top-level decision makers (cf. Mcdonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008). How do major 
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disturbances that dramatically increase perceived uncertainty and complexity influence such 
networks? Do we see more or less exclusive reliance on some experts at the expense of other 
experts (as has, arguably, been the case during the Covid 19-disruption (Ehrig & Foss, 2020))? How 
does this differ depending on the nature of the disturbance (e.g., natural disasters versus social 
disturbances, such as uprisings)?  
Challenge #3: Uncertainty 
The Covid-19 disruption illustrates that strategy in general, and behavioral strategy more 
specifically, do not have strong frameworks for dealing with uncertainty that goes beyond standard 
treatments of risky decision-making in various ways (fat-tailed distributions, ill-defined outcome 
space, diffuse priors, etc.).  Existing thinking on ill-structured problems (Mintzberg et al., 1976) and 
sense-making (Bettis & Prahalad, 1986; Weick, 1995) assume such conditions but do not offer 
much analytical detail when it comes to describing them. The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012) may also apply to situations of uncertainty, but it is not clear in 
this theory whether there are significant behavioral differences between reactions to risk and 
reactions to uncertainty. Most behavioral decision theory is ultimately based on a probabilistic 
framework.  
Moreover, we do not have good models for describing how situations of deep uncertainty may 
be transformed into more situations where Gaussian risk management techniques may be applied, 
what Ehrig and Foss (2020) call “epistemic funneling.” This process is not a “natural” one, but (cf. 
pt. 2 above) a social process in which deliberate information gathering, the reliance on some experts 
rather than other experts, etc. shape the funnel. A core issue here is how to best manage this process 
to arrive at precise, early estimates of costs and benefits of alternative strategic actions.   
As Ehrig and Jost (2020) points out, while strategy scholars have often argued that the core of 
strategy is simplification, very little rigorous thinking exists on this issue and it is not clear how 
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simplification varies with uncertainty. One may expect simplification to reduce as uncertainty 
increases. However, Ehrig and Jost show that the exact opposite holds, and suggest that adopting 
the better simplifications may hold the key to sustainable advantage. The intuition is that situations 
like the Covid-19 disruptions are characterized by so many unknown, interacting factors that trying 
to get a sophisticated grip on the situation is going to lead to overload and decision paralysis. 
Acting on simple strategies is better, because it stabilizes the situation. Over time the situation may 
become so stable that uncertainty is transformed to risk. In the context of the Covid-19 disruption, 
some may wish to argue that those countries that early on adopted very simple strategies to cope 
with the disruption (e.g., complete lockdown across the board) fared better in terms of life years 
saved than those countries that tried to adopt more sophisticated strategies (e.g., compare Norway 
and Sweden).  
However, a key issue is where the initial simple strategies adopted to cope with disruptions 
come from. Here the potential insights from the second challenge above becomes pertinent. Which 
coalitions hold power? What is the structure of the advice network that top decision makers are 
placed in? Which institutional logics dominate?   
CODA 
The disruption induced by Covid-19 will be studied by social scientists, psychologists, and 
historians for years to come. As suggested above, behavioral strategy may serve as a highly useful 
interpretive lens for such endeavors (see Jacobides, 2007, for an excellent model for such studies).  
In fact, what is particularly interesting about the disruption is that a whole panoply of behavioral 
strategy insights are applicable, as briefly suggested above. However, the Covid disruption may also 
point to some areas where behavioral strategy research is currently relatively weak, but where 
plenty of opportunities exist for interesting behavioral strategy research. 
 
11 
 
REFERENCES 
Andersen, A.L., Hansen, E.T., Johannesen, N., & Sheridan, A. 2020. Pandemic, Shutdown and 
Consumer Spending: Lessons from Scandinavian Policy Responses to COVID-19. Working 
Paper, Department of Economics, Copenhagen University. https://bit.ly/2UtRHQh 
Baker, S.R., Bloom, N., Davis, S.J., Kost, K., Sammon, M. & Viratyosin, T. 2020. The 
Unprecedented Stock Market Reaction to Covid-19. White Paper, the Becker-Stigler Institute 
for Economics at the University of Chicago.  
Chen, M-J., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. 1992. Action Characteristics as Predictors of 
Competitive Responses. Management Science. 38(3): 307-458.    
Choudhury, P. Starr, E. & Agarwal, R. 2020. Machine Learning and Human Capital 
Complementarities: Experimental Evidence on Bias Mitigation. Forthcoming at Strategic 
Management Journal. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185022 
Cyert, R. M. & March, J.G. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ehrig, T. & Foss, N.J. 2020. Risk, uncertainty and Covid-19. Quillette, 4. May, 2020.   
https://bit.ly/30r22Qx 
Ehrig, T. & Jost, J. 2020. Boundedly Rational Strategic Interaction and the Interplay between 
Complexity and Simplification: Implications for Strategy Science. Strategy Science 
(forthcoming). 
Felin, T., Foss, N.J., & Ployhardt, R. 2015. Microfoundations for Management Research. Academy 
of Management Annals 9: 575–632. 
Foss, N.J. & Klein, P.G. 2012. Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
12 
 
Gavetti, G., Levinthal, D., Greve, H. & Ocasio, W. 2012. The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: 
Assessment and Prospects. Academy of Management Annals 6(1):1-40. 
Greve, H. R. 1998. Performance, Aspirations, and Risky Organizational Change. Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 43(1): 58-86.   
Hambrick, D.C. & Crossland, C. 2018. A strategy for behavioral strategy: Appraisal of small, 
midsize, and large tent conceptions of this embryonic community. In M. Augier, C. Fang & 
V. Rindova, eds., Behavioral Strategy in Perspective (Advances in Strategic Management) 
39: 22-39. Emerald Publishing.  
Hambrick, D. C. & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its 
Top Managers. Academy of Management Review. 9 (2): 193-206.  
Jacobides, M. 2007.  The inherent limits of organizational structure and the unfulfilled role of 
hierarchy. Organization Science, 18: 455-477. 
Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux.  
Kahneman, D. & Lovallo, D. 1993. Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on 
Risk Taking.  Management Science, 39: 17-31. 
Kogut, B. & Kulatilaka. 2001. Capabilities as Real Options. Organization Science, 12:744-758 
Lant, T.K. & Baum J.A.C. 1995. Cognitive sources of socially constructed competitive groups: 
Examples from the Manhattan hotel industry. In: W. R. Scott & S. Christensen, eds., The 
Institutional Construcdtion of Organizations. 15-38. Sage Publications.  
Levinthal, D. A. & March, J. G. 1993. The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management Journal. 14 
(S2): 95-112.  
Lovallo, D. & Sibony, O. 2010.  The Case For Behavioral Strategy. McKinsey Quarterly: 30-40.   
13 
 
Macdonald, M. L., Khanna, P., & Westphal, J. 2008. Getting Them to Think Outside the Circle: 
Corporate Governance, Ceos' External Advice Networks, and Firm Performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51: 453-475. 
March, J.G. & Shapira, Z. 1992. Variable risk preferences and the focus of attention. Psychological 
Review, 99(1), 172–183. 
Maxmen, A. 2020. Why the World Bank ex-chief is on a mission to end coronavirus transmission. 
Nature, 58 (18). doi: 10.1038/d41586-020-01218-7 
Nelson, R.R. & Winter, S.G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press. 
Ocasio, W. 1997. Towards an Attention-Based View of The Firm. Strategic Management Journal. 
18(S1): 187-206.  
Porac, J. F. & Thomas, H. 1990. Taxonomic Mental Models in Competitor Definition. The 
Academy of Management Review. 15(2): 224-240.  
Powell, T. C., Lovallo, D. & Fox, C.R. 2011. Behavioral Strategy. Strategic Management Journal. 
32(13): 1369-1386.  
Prahalad, C. K. & Bettis, R. A. 1986. The dominant logic: A new linkage between diversity and 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 7(6): 485-501.  
Reger, R.K. & Huff, A.Sigismund. 1993. Strategic groups: A cognitive perspective. Strategic 
Management Journal. 14(2): 103-123.  
Staw, B. M. 1981. The escalation of commitment to a course of action.  Academy of Management 
Review, 6: 577-587. 
Taleb, N. 2007. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House.  
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509–533.  
14 
 
PGT Walker, C Whittaker, O Watson et al. 2020. The Global Impact of COVID-19 and Strategies 
for Mitigation and Suppression. Imperial College London; 26-03-2020 
doi: https://doi.org/10.25561/77735. 
Weick, K E.1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Sage Publications. University of Michigan.  
 
 
 
 
